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WARRANTING DATA SECURITY
Juliet M. Moringiello*
INTRODUCTION
Massive data security breaches have grabbed headlines in the past few
years. The data thieves responsible for these breaches have stolen the credit
and debit card data of customers of retailers such as TJ Maxx,1 DSW Shoe
Warehouse,2 BJ’s Wholesale Club,3 and the Hannaford grocery store chain.4
A thief in control of payment card data, which can include debit and credit
card numbers, expiration dates, security codes, and personal identification
numbers,5 has the ability to open new credit accounts and make charges on
existing consumer accounts. These data breaches leave individuals fearful
that their personal information will be used in ways that will disrupt their
financial transactions and damage their credit.6
The legal protection of privacy in the United States is far from
comprehensive.7 The level of privacy protection provided to individuals
depends on the sector of the economy in which they are participating.8 One
sector of the economy in which privacy legislation exists is the financial
sector, but the protection provided by such legislation is not
comprehensive.9 Although individuals may think that they have some
protected right to financial privacy because of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, that statute—which requires financial institutions to disclose their
privacy policies to consumers—does nothing to protect the consumer when

*
Professor, Widener University School of Law. I thank Ted Janger for organizing the
Symposium at which this paper was presented, and all the participants, especially James
Grimmelmann and Sarah Jane Hughes, for their very helpful comments on an early draft. Matthew
Banks provided terrific research assistance for this Article.
1. Ross Kerber, Banks in Region Set to Sue TJX Over Breach; Group Says Its Plan Reflects
Ire Over Lax Security by Retailers, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2007, at C1; Joseph Pereira, Jennifer
Levitz & Jeremy Singer-Vine, U.S. Indicts 11 in Global Credit-Card Scheme, WALL ST. J., Aug.
6, 2008, at A1.
2. Bill Husted & David Markiewicz, Info Theft Slams Chain; 1.4 Million Card Numbers
Stolen, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 20, 2005, at A1.
3. Todd Mason, Philadelphia-Based Sovereign Bank to Replace 83,000 Compromised Debit
Cards, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Washington), June 4, 2004, at 1.
4. Mark Albright, Grocer Credit Data is Swiped, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at
D1.
5. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.
Me. 2009).
6. Identity Theft: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 109th Cong.
28 (2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
7. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, JOHN A. ROTHCHILD, R. ANTHONY REESE &
GREGORY M. SILVERMAN, INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 390–92
(2nd ed. 2006).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 391.
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her financial information is stolen from the payment system.10 Despite the
fact that almost all states have provided a measure of protection to
consumers by enacting data breach notification statutes, these statutes
merely require companies that hold consumer data to notify consumers of a
breach so that the consumers can protect themselves.11 Data breach
notification statutes do not grant a private right of action to consumers to
recover their losses.12 A comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme
allocates losses in the credit and debit card systems, and this scheme tends
to pass fraud losses on to the banks that issue the cards.13 While this scheme
insulates the individual cardholders from most of the major financial losses
resulting from a data breach, it does nothing to compensate the cardholders
for the time and money they must spend to monitor their credit, obtain
replacement cards, cancel and reinstate recurring automatic payments, and
repair their credit in cases in which the data was used to open new
fraudulent accounts.
Consumers affected by data breaches understandably feel exposed to
serious financial harm, even in the absence of liability for fraudulent
charges. A consumer’s credit score affects her ability to finance important
purchases, and the events that occur in the aftermath of a data breach can
negatively affect that score.14 Because their losses are not addressed by
existing privacy and payment system statutes, consumers have attempted to
recover them using various common law theories; such theories, however,
have uniformly failed to provide them any meaningful recovery for these
losses.15 In this Article, I will discuss cases in which consumers have been
denied recovery for losses arising out of data breaches. I then focus on a
novel argument made by the plaintiffs in the Hannaford case. The
Hannaford plaintiffs argued that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
10. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
11. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-1-1–9-5-1 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H,
§§ 1–6 (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney Supp. 2010). As of April 2010,
“46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands had enacted
legislation requiring notice to individuals of security breaches involving personal information.”
See State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreach
NotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). Several attempts to pass a
federal data breach notification law have failed. See Donald G. Aplin, Network Security: Carper,
Bennett Reintroduce Bipartisan Financial Data Security, Breach Notice Bill, BNA: ELECTRONIC
COMM. & L. REP., July 21, 2010, http://news.bna.com/epln (search “Donald G. Aplin”; then
follow “7/19/2010” hyperlink).
12. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (stressing that the
Indiana data breach notification statute grants enforcement authority only to the Attorney
General).
13. See generally Truth in Lending Act of 1968 §§ 102–87, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006);
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 § 902, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006).
14. Gail Hillebrand, After the FACTA: State Power to Prevent Identity Theft, 17 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 53, 55–57 (2004).
15. See discussion infra Part II.
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Code (UCC) should provide a remedy to individuals harmed by a data
breach because every time a retailer accepts a payment card from a buyer, it
warrants that its payment system is secure.16
While a warranty of data security might be a good idea, Article 2 is not
the best place for it because of its limitation to sales of goods. Instead,
courts could impose a common law warranty of data security, under which
all sellers would warrant that their chosen payment system is secure. In this
Article, I will propose a non-waivable common-law warranty of data
security that is drawn from both Article 2 warranties and the warranties
provided in Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC which apply to negotiable
instruments and the check collection system.17 I will then compare the
problem of ensuring safe data transactions today to the problem of ensuring
the habitability of rental housing in the mid-20th century, which judges
addressed by imposing an implied warranty of habitability in leases for
residential real property.18 The story of that warranty can add to the
discussion about how best to ensure the safety of personal financial data.19
To develop my argument, in Part I, I will describe the mechanics of a
data breach. In Part II, I will focus on the case law to discuss the difficulties
that consumers face in recovering their data breach losses. I discuss various
UCC warranties in Part III, and in Part IV, I analogize today’s data security
problems to the problems of scarce habitable rental housing in the midtwentieth century and suggest that today’s courts should protect personal
financial data by imposing a warranty modeled in part on the warranty of
habitability developed by courts in the 1970s. I conclude by calling on
courts to develop a common-law warranty to compensate individuals
harmed by data breaches.
I. ANATOMY OF A DATA BREACH
A payment card transaction involves four parties—the card issuer, the
customer, the merchant, and the merchant bank—each of which is in
control of payment data at some point in the transaction.20 The role of
merchant bank is complicated because a merchant bank may itself act as
acquirer or processor, or it may sponsor access to the payment card network

16. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D.
Me. 2009).
17. U.C.C. §§ 3-416, 3-417, 4-207, 4-208 (2002).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. Modern data collection practices provide legal scholars with an excellent opportunity to
analogize privacy regulation to the regulations of past social problems. See generally James
Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.J. 793 (2010). One possible analogy is
to product safety regulation. Id. at 813.
20. Julia S. Cheney, Heartland Payment Systems: Lessons Learned from a Data Breach 1
(Payments Cards Center, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper No. 10-1, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540143.
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for its partner transaction processor.21 Some data breaches, such as the TJ
Maxx data breach, involved data in the merchant’s control.22 Others, such
as the Heartland Payment Systems (Heartland) breach, involved data in the
processor’s control.23 In some cases, it is difficult to determine the identity
of the party at fault for the breach, and as a result, the retailer and its
payment processor are often both named as defendants in data breach
suits.24
The TJ Maxx breach, which was discovered by the company in
December 2006, involved customer data held in the company’s computer
systems.25 In a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, the company
claimed that the data thieves, using software they placed in the company’s
systems without authorization, captured both unencrypted and encrypted
data.26 The company reported in its filing that it believed that the hackers
had access to the decryption tool for the encryption software used by TJ
Maxx.27 According to one news report on the breach, this decryption tool
could have been acquired by an insider who participated in the data theft or
by a successful entry into the TJ Maxx database where the decryption keys
were held.28
The Heartland and Hannaford breaches were different from prior
attacks in that the hackers focused not on data stored in a consumer
database, but on data as it moved from the stores to the credit card
processors.29 In late 2007, fraudsters breached Heartland’s system by a
method known as SQL injection,30 which allowed them to exploit a

21. Id. at 1–2.
22. See TJX Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://ir.10kwizard.com/files.php?source=487&page=14&ext=1 (reporting that TJX had suffered
“an unauthorized intrusion into portions of [its] computer system”).
23. Cheney, supra note 20, at 3.
24. See, e.g., Amerifirst Bank v. TJX Co., Inc., 564 F.3d 489, 491–92 (1st Cir. 2009) (naming
both the retailer and its processing bank as defendants, alleging that they both “failed to follow
security protocols prescribed by Visa and MasterCard”).
25. See TJX Co., Annual Report, supra note 22, at 7.
26. Id. at 9.
27. See id.
28. Larry Greenemeier, T.J. Maxx Parent Company Data Theft is the Worst Ever,
INFORMATIONWEEK.COM (Mar. 29, 2007), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/show
Article.jhtml?articleID=198701100.
29. See Linda McGlasson, Hannaford Data Breach May Be ‘Tip of Iceberg’, BANK INFO
SECURITY (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=810 (quoting a
security expert who described the Hannaford incident as “highly significant because it represents
the first publicly-acknowledged theft of sensitive card authorization data in transit”); see also
Cheney, supra note 20, at 3.
30. SQL stands for “structured query language,” which is defined as “a standardized language
for defining and manipulating data in a relational database.” IBM, SQL REFERENCE VOLUME 1, 1
(2006), available at ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/ps/products/db2/info/vr9/pdf/letter/en_US/db2
s1e90.pdf. For a good explanation of how SQL works and a detailed description of some of the
high-profile data breaches mentioned in this article, see generally James Verini, The Hacker Who
Went Into the Cold, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 14, 2010, at 44.
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vulnerability in Heartland’s corporate and payment processing networks.31
They then installed software that captured payment card data as it moved
through Heartland’s system.32 In early 2008, Hannaford discovered that
hackers had placed malicious software on their servers to capture payment
card information.33 The software picked up credit card numbers and
expiration dates as they traveled through the system and sent that
information to overseas servers.34
It is important to note that the Payment Cards Industry Standards
Council, founded by the five payment card networks, manages a set of
security standards (known collectively as the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard, or PCI DSS)35 with which all merchants and processors
must comply in order to participate in the card payment systems.36 While TJ
Maxx had not fully complied with the PCI DSS standards,37 Heartland had
been certified as compliant at the time its system was breached.38 PCI DSS
is not seen as the “gold standard” in data security, however, and most
companies do more to protect their data than is required by PCI DSS.39
The amount of data compromised in these breaches can be staggering.
The Hannaford data breach resulted in the theft of 4.2 million credit and
debit card numbers and related information such as PIN codes.40 The DSW
Shoe Warehouse breach involved more than 1.4 million credit and debit
card numbers and almost 100,000 checking account numbers and driver’s
license numbers.41 The BJ’s Wholesale Club breach allowed “unauthorized
parties [to gain] access to magnetic stripe data from 9.2 million credit
cards.”42 The TJ Maxx breach was one of the largest, with 94 million
compromised records, according to one estimate.43 The largest breach to
date was the Heartland breach, which affected about 130 million credit and

31. Cheney, supra note 20, at 3.
32. Id.
33. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.
Me. 2009).
34. McGlasson, supra note 29.
35. About the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL,
http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Bill Brenner, TJX Security Breach Tied to Wi-Fi Exploits, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (May
8, 2007), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/08/08/223672/TJX-security-breach-tiedto-Wi-Fi-exploits.htm.
38. See Cheney, supra note 20, at 4.
39. See id. (discussing the observations of Bob Carr, the CEO of Heartland Payment Systems).
40. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.
Me. 2009).
41. Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
42. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Mass. 2009).
43. See Data Security Breaches Reach a Record in 2007, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2007, at B5
(reporting that while the company acknowledged that 46 million records were compromised, Visa
and MasterCard estimated that 94 million TJ Maxx records were compromised).
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debit cards.44 These breaches have exposed the personal financial data of
millions of individuals, giving unauthorized parties the ability to enter into
fraudulent payment card transactions. The data thief is often hard to find, so
the data breach victims seek recovery from the company to whom they
entrusted their information by making a payment.45 Although consumers are
protected from liability for the fraudulent transactions themselves, they
have had almost no success recovering other costs arising from these
breaches.46
II. THWARTED ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER FOR DATA THEFT
Rules governing both credit cards and debit cards protect consumers
from most of the liability for fraudulent charges. The Truth in Lending Act
limits the liability of a consumer for unauthorized use of her credit card to
$5047 and many credit card issuers promise no liability to cardholders if the
cardholder notifies the issuer immediately after the card was lost or stolen.48
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act contains a $50 liability limitation for the
unauthorized use of a debit card, but the consumer can be liable for a
greater amount if she fails to report the loss of her card within a prescribed
amount of time.49 Yet data breaches cause consumers to suffer a wide range
of other financial and non-financial harms.
Consumer plaintiffs in data breach cases have alleged a variety of
harms. Although they ultimately incur little to no liability for unauthorized
charges, consumer victims of a data breach spend time and money to
address and resolve their financial disruptions.50 For example, an individual
whose personal information has been compromised as a result of a data
breach often feels the need to pay to monitor her credit51 because an
unauthorized party might use the stolen data to assume the affected
individual’s identity and obtain credit or other benefits fraudulently in that

44. Linda McGlasson, Heartland Breach: Consumer Settlement Proposed, BANK INFO
SECURITY (May 6, 2010), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2498.
45. See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 114; Hendricks, 444 F. Supp. 2d at
776; Settlement Agreement, In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.
(S. D. Tex. 2009) (No. 4:09-MD-2-46), available at http://www.hpscardholdersettlement.com/
Documents/Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [hereinafter Heartland Settlement Agreement].
46. See discussion infra Part II.
47. Truth in Lending Act of 1968 § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (a) (1) (2006).
48. See Mastercard Zero Liability: Zero Liability Protection for Lost & Stolen Cards,
MASTERCARD, http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/zeroliability.html
(last visited Aug. 27, 2010); Visa Zero Liability, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_
security_program/zero_liability.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
49. Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 § 909, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2006).
50. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
51. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Hannaford Bros.
Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116; Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777
(W.D. Mich. 2006); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (D. Minn.
2006).
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person’s name.52 If that individual finds unauthorized payments or charges
on her bank and credit card statements, she must take the time to contest the
fraudulent charges. As a result, many victims of a data breach seek
compensation for credit monitoring costs.53 The Hannaford plaintiffs
alleged a comprehensive list of harms, which covered almost everything
that can happen when the security of a credit or debit card is
compromised.54 Some customers were deprived of the use of their cards
because their bank accounts were overdrawn and their credit limits were
exceeded.55 Customers also lost bonus points on their cards for the period of
time when their cards were cancelled.56 Some banks required customers to
pay for replacement cards.57 Customers were also forced to spend time
dealing with pre-authorized charges because they had to give new credit
card numbers to the payees to whom the pre-authorized payments were
made.58 When a consumer’s pre-authorized payments cannot be made
because the credit card on file is not valid, the consumer incurs additional
charges such as late fees. Therefore, the Hannaford plaintiffs also claimed
damages for the disruption of their pre-authorized charge relationships.59
Courts have rejected consumer attempts to recover these costs.
Most courts have found that the harms caused by the exposure of personal
financial information are too speculative to form the basis for a claim for
damages in either contract or tort law.60 In Pisciotta v. Old National
Bancorp, the plaintiffs sought compensation, under a negligence theory, for
both the credit monitoring services they were forced to obtain and for the
emotional distress that they suffered after their personal financial
information was taken from the defendant bank’s Web site.61 In order to
recover on their negligence claim, the plaintiffs were required to show that
they suffered “a compensable injury proximately caused by [the bank’s]
breach of duty.”62 To show that they had suffered a compensable harm, the
plaintiffs pointed to the Indiana data breach notification statute, arguing that
the Indiana legislature, by enacting such a statute, agreed that consumers
suffer compensable harm at the moment their personal financial information
52. See Heartland Settlement Agreement, supra note 45, at 12–13.
53. See, e.g., Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631; In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116;
Forbes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
54. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007); Forbes v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe
Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779–81 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
61. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631–32.
62. Id. at 635 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216–17 (Ind.
2000)).
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is compromised by a data breach.63 The court rejected this argument, noting
the absence of any statement by the legislature that it intended to allow such
a recovery.64
The plaintiffs in Forbes v. Wells Fargo were also denied recovery for
credit monitoring costs.65 In that case, the plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for
both negligence and breach of contract when their financial information was
stolen from a Wells Fargo service provider.66 The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that credit monitoring expenses were not
incurred because of any present injury, but were rather incurred to prevent
future injury, stressing that the plaintiffs’ injuries were “solely the result of
a perceived risk of future harm.”67 The court denied the plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claims in Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse because the plaintiff
did not prove that her personal information had been used in any way and
therefore had suffered no cognizable loss.68 The court characterized the
plaintiffs’ claim for credit monitoring costs as “damages to buy peace of
mind.”69
Although several plaintiffs have attempted to recover for their losses on
a breach of contract theory, the Hannaford plaintiffs made a particularly
novel contract argument. They argued that every time Hannaford accepted a
payment card, it impliedly warranted that its payment system “was fit for its
intended purpose, namely the safe and secure processing of credit and debit
card payment transactions,” and that this warranty was breached because
the system “allowed wrongdoers to steal the customers’ confidential
personal and financial data.”70 This resembles the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose from Article 2 of the UCC.71 The plaintiffs
argued not that the Article 2 warranty applies by its terms to payment
processing transactions, but that Article 2 “provides an ‘analogue’ on which
[the] . . . court should draw in crafting a common law implied warranty to
fit their situation.”72
The court refused to imply such a warranty for several reasons,
focusing on the requirements of Article 2.73 In order for a warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose to be implied in a contract of sale, the seller
must have reason to know of two facts: the particular purpose for which the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 637.
Id.
See Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779–81 (W.D. Mich.

2006).
69. Id. at 780.
70. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119–20
(D. Me. 2009) (quotations omitted).
71. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002).
72. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
73. Id.
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buyer requires the goods, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or
judgment in selecting or furnishing such goods.74 The court emphasized that
the warranty applies to goods sold, and the definition of goods does not
include the payment system used to process the payment for the goods.75 In
addition, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied
not when a buyer seeks goods for their ordinary purpose, but only when a
buyer seeks goods for a purpose that is particular to that buyer’s needs.76
The court correctly observed that the buyers did not use the payment system
for a particular purpose;77 instead, they relied on it to process credit and
debit card payments in the same way as did all other grocery purchasers.78
However, while Article 2 may not be the best place to locate a warranty
or provide the best analogy, implying a warranty of data security in
consumer payment transactions is a good idea. A better analogy might be
the non-waivable implied warranty of habitability developed by courts in
the early 1970s to respond to the societal changes wrought by
urbanization.79 As I will discuss in Part IV, some of the same concerns that
drove the courts of forty years ago to protect consumers of urban rental
housing exist today in the area of payment data security.80
An implied warranty of data security would allow consumers to recover
their losses without overly straining established legal doctrines. Today,
there are two major impediments to recovery for the losses that individuals
incur as a result of a data breach. The first, applicable to both contract and
tort actions, is that the damages are seen as too speculative.81 Second,
purely economic losses that are not coupled with personal injury or physical
property damage are not recoverable in tort.82 One justification for this
doctrine is to allow parties to allocate their economic losses by contract.83 In
the consumer context, however, reliance on freedom of contract often fails
to protect consumer welfare.84 Because of this preference for freedom of
contract, consumers appear doomed to absorb some costs of data breaches
themselves. In order for an implied warranty of data security to truly protect

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002).
In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. 2.
In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
Id.
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See discussion infra Part IV.
See cases cited supra note 60.
In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 127; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-5, at 538–39 (6th ed. 2010); Michael D. Scott,
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV.
425, 470 (2008).
83. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 11-5, at 541.
84. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2008) (arguing that markets for consumer credit function only when consumers are rational and
informed).
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consumers, it would have to be non-waivable. There is precedent for nonwaivable warranties both in the UCC and the common law.85 The remainder
of this Article will discuss the various warranties that are implied in
commercial transactions, and will propose that an implied warranty of data
security be imposed on retailers.
III. EXISTING UCC WARRANTIES: CAN WE EXPAND THEM TO
PROTECT DATA?
The proposed warranty of data security would be implied in all
contracts between a seller accepting a payment card and the buyer using
that card. The seller is the best person to give such a warranty because the
seller is the party who deals with the consumer and is also the party that the
consumer trusts to handle her payments safely. The seller would be
warranting the safety of a transaction, not a product. Nevertheless, elements
of several UCC warranties can be incorporated into an implied warranty of
data security.
The UCC implies several warranties under Article 2, which governs
sales of goods, and Articles 3 and 4, which govern some aspects of the
payment system.86 The persons giving these warranties represent that a
product,87 a transaction,88 or both89 meet certain quality and reliability
requirements. Parties to a transaction can waive some,90 but not all,91 of
these warranties. Although a payment card transaction falls strictly outside
of the UCC’s scope—and therefore a warranty protecting it could not find a
home in the UCC—an implied warranty of data security could draw on and
combine elements of several of these warranties. In the remainder of this
section, I will discuss the elements of the UCC warranties that should be
included in a warranty of data security and argue that a warranty approach
to the data breach problem has several advantages over a tort approach.
A. UCC PRODUCT WARRANTIES
Under the implied warranties of merchantability92 and fitness for a
particular purpose,93 a seller in a transaction governed by Article 2 promises
that goods sold meet some standard of quality (in the case of
85. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081–82 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that the implied warranty of habitability is non-waivable); U.C.C. § 3-417(e) (2003)
(providing that the Article 3 presentment warranty cannot be waived with respect to checks).
86. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-312–317, 2-321, 3-318, 3-415–416, 4-207–209 (2002).
87. See infra notes 93–123 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 125–134 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
90. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2002) (setting forth the requirements for Article 2 warranty disclaimers).
91. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-417(e) (2003) (providing that the Article 3 presentment warranty
cannot be disclaimed with respect to checks).
92. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).
93. Id. § 2-315.
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merchantability) or of suitability (in the case of fitness for a particular
purpose). A seller in a payment card transaction is providing two different
things: the product or service sold, and the system that processes the
payment.
A discussion of an argument that the Hannaford plaintiffs could have
but failed to make illustrates some of the advantages and disadvantages in
using Article 2 of the UCC to protect payment card data. Rather than asking
the court to apply the Article 2 warranties by analogy, the Hannaford
plaintiffs could have argued that the payment system software itself
breached the warranty of merchantability that is implied, unless excluded,
in all contracts covered by Article 2.94 Most courts have held that the
transfer of software is a sale of goods for the purpose of Article 2.95
However, the software warranty in a payment card transaction would first
run from the payment software vendor to the retailer, leaving the plaintiffs
with a privity barrier, one that I will explain below.
An examination of this hypothetical argument highlights some of the
benefits that an implied warranty might give consumers in payment card
transactions and also illustrates the impediments that consumers would face
in relying on existing warranties. First, the warranty of merchantability is
implied in all contracts for the sale of goods in which the seller is a
merchant.96 The UCC defines a merchant as “a person who deals in goods
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction.”97 All merchants give this warranty because they, as merchant
sellers, hold themselves out as having special knowledge with respect to the
products sold.98 A buyer need not show that he relied on any representations
made by the seller in order to recover for breach of warranty.99 Because the
warranty of merchantability is implied, unless excluded, in all transactions
in which goods are sold by a merchant, it is curious that the Hannaford
plaintiffs did not try to claim damages for its breach.100
The application to all merchant seller transactions is one element of the
warranty of merchantability that should be incorporated into a warranty of
data security. For this purpose, a merchant can be defined as anyone who

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Scott, supra note 82, at 436 (discussing judicial classification of software).
U.C.C. § 2-314.
Id. § 2-104(1).
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 10-11, at 482 (tracing the logic behind the warranty
of merchantability to the pre-Code warranty implied in transactions with manufacturers).
99. Id.
100. According to the two leading commentators on the UCC, a key reason that a transferee
might seek to classify its transaction as a purchase of goods is to receive the benefit of Article 2’s
warranty of merchantability. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 10-2, at 449.
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accepts a payment card for goods or services.101 Merchant sellers choose the
persons responsible for handling the data that they collect,102 so imposing a
warranty on these sellers would force them to choose their payment
processors carefully and to negotiate indemnification clauses with those
processors.
To satisfy the implied warranty of merchantability, the seller must
provide goods that “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which [they] are
used”103 and that “pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description.”104 A merchant who provides customers with the convenience
of using a card payment system should be deemed to represent that its
payment system is fit for the ordinary purpose for which a payment system
is used—the safe and secure processing of a purchaser’s payment data. One
of the reasons the plaintiffs’ warranty argument failed in the Hannaford
case was that the plaintiffs had chosen to argue for a warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose despite the fact that the payment system was actually
being used for its ordinary purpose.105 An argument that the payment
system in the transaction was not fit for its ordinary purposes might have
fared better.
There are two major intertwined problems with arguing that an
individual victim of a data breach can recover from the provider of payment
software under the implied warranty of merchantability. First, the implied
warranty of merchantability can be disclaimed in the contract between the
buyer and seller.106 Sellers of goods tend not to disclaim this warranty
altogether, choosing instead to limit the damages recoverable because
concerns for future business force attention to quality.107
One reason that suing the payment system software vendors is
undesirable is that the problem of warranty disclaimers is magnified when
the product transferred is software. The tumultuous drafting history of
Article 2B of the UCC (which became the Uniform Computer Information
101. Individuals making isolated sales could be exempted from this definition. U.C.C. § 2-314
cmt. 3 (2002) (exempting a person making an isolated sale from the Article 2 implied warranty of
merchantability). These individuals do not participate in the payment system by choosing from a
variety of payment processors; if they do accept payment cards, they do so through person-toperson payment systems such as PayPal. See PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com (select “personal”
tab; then select “get paid” from top bar; then select “accept credit cards” from drop-down list)
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (explaining how individuals can accept payment cards through PayPal
from persons who do not have PayPal accounts).
102. Businesses can choose among many payment processing service companies. See, e.g.,
ACH PAYMENTS, http://www.ach-payments.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010); ELIOT
MANAGEMENT GROUP, http://www.e-mg.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010); HEARTLAND
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, http://www.heartlandpaymentsystems.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
103. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
104. Id. § 2-314(2)(a).
105. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120
(D. Me. 2009).
106. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2002).
107. DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 151 (4th ed. 2009).
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Transactions Act after the American Law Institute withdrew from the
project) shows how averse software vendors are to Article 2 warranty
liability.108 Software vendors almost universally disclaim the warranty of
merchantability because vendors contend that “[c]omputer software has
peculiar qualities” that render a comparison among software programs
senseless.109 Such a comparison is necessary in order to determine that
software would “pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description,” for the purpose of the warranty of merchantability.110
Second, even in the unlikely absence of a disclaimer, the aggrieved
individuals would have difficulty recovering for a breach of warranty
because they never buy or take a transfer of the payment processing
software.111 Because warranty liability is based on contract law, the general
rule is that a warrantor is directly liable only to the person with whom it has
a contract.112 The harsh effects of this general rule have been ameliorated in
the sale of goods area, and today, most manufacturer warranties run to the
ultimate buyer for two reasons. First, most states have eliminated the
vertical privity requirement by common law when a consumer is personally
injured by a manufacturer’s product.113 Second, most manufacturers, for
reasons of reputation, treat their warranties as though they run to the
ultimate purchaser.114
This erosion of the privity barrier would not assist a consumer harmed
by a data breach, however. Although Article 2 of the UCC allows nonbuyers affected by a product to sue for breach of warranty, most states, in
their versions of Article 2, deny a cause of action to a third party non-buyer
in the absence of personal injury.115 A person whose payment card data has
been stolen has not suffered any personal injury. In states that have adopted
the third alternative to § 2-318, a third party has a cause of action against
108. See generally Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability
Theory in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1999) (discussing the
Article 2B drafting process).
109. Robert Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software Contracts: A
Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 393, 398–99 (1997); Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws
Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1150 (2009) (quoting Scott, supra note 82, at 426)
(explaining that “software vendors have traditionally . . . used various risk allocation provisions of
[the U.C.C.] to shift the risk of insecure software to the licensee”).
110. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2) (2002); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 109 (explaining that, as
essentially diverse collections of ideas that cannot reasonably be compared to one another,
attempts to identify minimum quality standards for software products would be difficult and
unfair).
111. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 121
(D. Me. 2009); see also Cheney, supra note 20, at 1–2 (describing a credit card transaction).
112. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313–315 (2000); see also Metro. Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784
(2d Cir. 1946) (“A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact
upon which the other party may rely.”).
113. KEATING, supra note 107, at 178–79.
114. Id. at 178.
115. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 12-3, at 546.
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the seller if it is “injured” by the breach of warranty.116 This alternative
would seem to allow someone harmed by payment processing software to
recover. In these states, however, a seller can disclaim the warranty as to
third parties who did not suffer personal injury as a result of the breach of
warranty.117
The foregoing discussion illustrates the hurdles that a consumer would
face in attempting to recover damages from a payment software vendor for
breach of the Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability. Although
imposition of the Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability to payment
transactions is not feasible, the policies underlying the warranty are
particularly salient to today’s electronic payment transactions. Before the
mass production of goods, buyers were bound by caveat emptor and no
warranties were implied.118 The old law was based on a system in which
traders were neighbors.119 Caveat emptor was considered just in face-toface transactions in which the seller and buyer had roughly equal
commercial experience and the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the
goods he was buying.120 Over the course of the last century, courts and
legislatures have chipped away at the doctrine, recognizing the inequality of
knowledge and bargaining power between buyers and sellers.121 As mass
production of goods proliferated, warranties were imposed on professional
sellers.122 The move away from caveat emptor was slower in real estate law,
as mass production of housing did not emerge until after World War II.123
Caveat emptor has no place in card payment transactions. Payment
processing transactions are completely invisible to consumers. The clerk at
my local grocery store will ask me whether I want to use my Visa debit card
(which is not a credit card) as a “debit or credit” card, having no idea that
she is asking me which payment network (the Visa network or the PINbased debit card network) I want to use.124
B. UCC TRANSACTION WARRANTIES
The discussion above analogizes a warranty of data security to a
warranty of product quality. The UCC imposes transaction warranties as
well,125 and a data security warranty might be better analogized to such a
116. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2003).
117. Id. § 2-318 cmt. 2.
118. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Innovation in the Law of Warranty: The Burden of Reform, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 341, 356 (1980).
119. See Allison Dunham, Vendor’s Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
37 MINN. L. REV. 108, 110 (1952).
120. See Sullivan, supra note 118, at 356.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 356–57.
123. See Dunham, supra note 119, at 111.
124. I would not know that either had I not taught Payment Systems for a number of years.
125. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-312 (2002).
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warranty. These transaction warranties also contain elements that a court
could incorporate in an implied warranty of data security. Unlike the
warranty of merchantability, the implied warranty of title helps to ensure
the quality of the transaction in which the goods are transferred.126
Therefore, a seller giving a warranty of title promises that the transaction is
reliable.127 Under Article 2, all sellers give a warranty that title to the goods
“shall be good and its transfer rightful.”128 This warranty has nothing to do
with the quality of the product, rather it relates to the transactions in which
the goods reach the seller. If there is a thief in the chain of title, the seller
breaches the warranty.129 The UCC permits a seller to disclaim this
warranty, but any disclaimer must clearly indicate that the seller claims no
title in the goods sold.130
The purpose behind this warranty is to ensure that the buyer will not be
exposed to litigation in order to protect its title to the goods because of
defects in purchase transactions in his chain of title.131 Although the implied
warranty of title looks backwards, holding the seller liable for the
wrongdoing of persons in the past, its basic purpose, to protect the buyer
from transaction defects, could be used as a basis for an implied warranty of
data security. A data security warranty would necessarily be forwardlooking, but it would also serve to guarantee the quality of a chain of
transactions, rather than a product. A warranty of data security can ensure
that someone who uses a payment card will not be forced to incur costs to
protect her personal information from misuse in the chain of transfers
comprising a payment transaction.
The warranty of title imposes strict liability on the seller.132 Under UCC
§ 2-312, a seller is not protected from liability on the warranty of title by his
lack of knowledge that the title conveyed is not good.133 A thief of goods
breaks the chain of title, so the warranty of title functions to pass the risk
that the transaction is not good to the person who dealt most closely with
the thief.134 The result is to place the loss on the person best situated to
avoid it. Using the same logic, a seller who takes a payment card is best
situated to guard against unsafe payment transactions, and if it enters into
an unsafe payment transaction with a consumer, it should bear the loss
regardless of its knowledge that the transaction may be unsafe.
In the payment system, as in the sales system, warranties play an
important loss allocation function. Payment warranties pass the risk of fraud
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. § 2-312(1)(a).
Id. § 2-312.
See West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1045 (Colo. 2006).
U.C.C. § 2-312(3).
Id. § 2-312(1) cmt. 1.
Id. § 2-312.
KEATING, supra note 107, at 279.
See id. at 279–80.
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to the person closest to the fraud. When a bank pays the wrong person by
honoring a check bearing a forged endorsement, it must re-credit its
customer’s account.135 The warranties under Article 4 of the UCC then
allow the bank to seek compensation from persons up the collection
stream.136 However, unlike most warrantors in the sales system, those
giving payment warranties vouch for both the transaction and the product.
The warrantor of a negotiable instrument vouches for the product (the
negotiable instrument) in that it warrants that “the instrument has not been
altered” and that “all signatures . . . are authentic and authorized,” but it also
vouches for the transaction in that it warrants that it is “entitled to enforce
the instrument” and that “the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim
in recoupment by any party.”137
In order to effectively protect personal financial information, the
implied warranty of data security should be non-waivable. There is
precedent in the UCC for a non-waivable warranty. The warranties in
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC cannot be disclaimed with respect to checks.138
This prohibition of disclaimers protects the checking system; checks are
collected and paid by automated means, so banks rely on the warranties for
their protection.139
Warranty is a good theory on which to give a remedy to injured
consumers. Privity remains an issue in imposing a warranty of data security
on data controllers. Privity is not a problem when the merchant itself is
responsible for the breach, because that merchant will always have a
contract with the aggrieved purchaser. Lack of privity, however, should not
bar recovery from the payment processors. All consumers entering the
payment system through a merchant, however, have a contract with that
merchant.140 Therefore, imposing a warranty on that merchant makes sense;
that merchant must then either make sure that it protects the data, or
negotiate an agreement with its processor that the processor will protect the
data and indemnify the merchant from any losses as a result of a data
breach. The retailer is in the best position to know whether its processor

135. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 16-3, at 754.
136. See id.
137. U.C.C. § 3-416 (2002) (setting forth transfer warranties); id. § 3-417 (setting forth
presentment warranties, which do not include a warranty that there are no defenses or claims in
recoupment to the instrument); id. § 4-207 (setting forth transfer warranties in the check collection
system); id. § 4-208 (setting forth presentment warranties in the check collection system, which
also do not include the warranty that there are no defenses or claims in recoupment).
138. See id. §§ 3-416(c), 3-417(e), 4-207(d), 4-208(e).
139. See id. § 3-417 cmt. 7.
140. Consumers use the payment system for several reasons: to purchase goods, services, and
information, and to make loan payments. In all of these transactions, there is some contract
between the consumer and the merchant. See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D. Me. 2009) (“Both sides agree that at the point of
sale—the cash register—there is a contract for the sale of groceries.”).
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handles data safely, and can choose to use a more secure system if the
processor will not cover losses from data breaches.
Contract law, unlike tort law, allows recovery for purely economic loss.
A buyer aggrieved by a breach of the warranty of merchantability can
recover the difference in value between the goods accepted and the goods as
warranted.141 This difference can be measured by the cost of repair.142 The
damages claimed by consumer plaintiffs in data breach cases are in essence
claims for the cost of repair to their credit profile, because a consumer who
must pay for card replacement or credit monitoring is trying to restore the
data to the condition it was in before the breach. Recognizing this type of
remedy would eliminate one of the major hurdles to protecting data security
through tort law—the limitations on economic loss damages.
Some have suggested treating privacy concerns in a manner analogous
to product safety.143 Although both tort law and contract law have a role in
ensuring product safety, those who urge a product safety approach to
privacy have focused primarily on tort law.144 Some have proposed a tort
action based on strict products liability for data breaches;145 products
liability law, however, does not often grant recovery for economic loss.146
While some have argued that new technology begs a redefinition of
injury,147 a warranty approach would not force courts to strain existing tort
doctrine in that way. Every transaction in which payment data is passed is a
contract transaction, either for goods, information, or services. Therefore, a
contract will always exist into which a warranty of data security could be
implied. The tendency of courts to rule that one party to a contract cannot
sue the other party for negligence might make such an implied warranty
preferable to a tort action.148
There is no doubt that consumers are harmed by unauthorized uses of
their personal financial data even in the absence of liability for the
141. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2002). A buyer can also recover incidental and consequential damages.
Id. § 2-714(3).
142. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 11-2, at 518.
143. See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 19.
144. See id. at 814–17 (discussing several scholars’ approaches to protecting personal
information using a product safety analogy).
145. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 296 (2007); Scott, supra
note 82, at 470 (identifying the economic loss rule as “[t]he most significant impediment to the
use of strict product liability law to recover damages caused by insecure software”).
146. See James J. White, Reverberations from the Collision of Tort and Warranty, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 1067, 1068 (2002) (“loss that is solely ‘economic’ may be recovered in warranty but not in
tort”) (citing Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2001); Calloway v.
City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Nev. 2000); Steiner v. Ford Motor Co., 606 N.W.2d 881, 884
(N.D. 2000)). Courts have rejected this cause of action in data breach cases. See, e.g., Amerifirst
Bank v. TJX Co., Inc., 564 F.3d 489, 498 (1st Cir. 2009).
147. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 145, at 295–96.
148. See Scott, supra note 82, at 456 (discussing tendency of courts to deny plaintiffs’
negligence claims when those plaintiffs are parties to contracts with their defendants).
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fraudulent charges made to their accounts. Although a warranty of data
security is desirable, data security does not fit neatly into the existing UCC
warranties for several reasons. First, the articles in the UCC are organized
by type of transaction. Even if a warranty regarding goods could be
stretched to include the payment system used to purchase the goods, many
payment transactions do not involve goods. The payment system contains
numerous warranties, but these warranties—designed to place the risk of
fraud in checking and other negotiable instrument transactions on the
person closest to the fraud—do nothing to compensate an individual who is
harmed by identity theft. Revising the UCC to include data security within
the Article 2 warranties is probably politically unfeasible149 and in addition,
an Article 2 warranty would not give any recovery to those whose data was
taken in a sale of services transaction.
IV. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY: A GOOD
ANALOGY?
To adequately protect consumers, any warranty of data security should
be implied in all payment card transactions between an individual and a
merchant and should be non-waivable. The use of payment cards to pay for
almost everything has allowed sellers and payment processors to collect
tremendous amounts of personal financial information. Havoc ensues when
this information falls into the wrong hands. The changes in the conduct of
business wrought by the electronic processing of payments beg a judiciallycreated remedy tailored to the emerging and serious problem of data theft.
One can find precedent for such a remedy in landlord-tenant law. In this
section, I will apply lessons from landlord-tenant law to the protection of
payment card data.
Real property law provides some precedent for judge-made, nonwaivable warranties to protect consumers. One that exists today—either by
statute or case law in nearly every state and the District of Columbia—is the
warranty of habitability implied in leases for residential real property.150
This warranty that a dwelling be safe, clean, and fit for human habitation
cannot be waived in a lease.151
149. The goal of the UCC’s sponsoring bodies, the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is to draft a uniform law that can be
enacted in all U.S. jurisdictions. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process
Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 571 n. 8 (1998).
For an excellent discussion of political pressures in the uniform law drafting process, see id. at
582–93.
150. See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 417
(2002).
151. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984). Another implied real estate warranty is
the warranty of workmanlike quality that is given from the builder to the buyer of a newlyconstructed home; this is also a consumer-protective warranty. Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d
290, 294 (N.H. 1988). The warranty of workmanlike quality is given only by builders of new
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The initial judicial imposition of this warranty recognized the
modernization of the landlord-tenant relationship. When the common law
landlord-tenant rules first developed, the typical lessee was more interested
in the land than the dwelling and was expected to make repairs to the
dwelling himself.152 The modern urban tenant is interested solely in a
habitable dwelling, and has neither the ability nor economic incentive to
make repairs to the dwelling because his lease is often for a fairly short
term.153 Courts relied on consumer protection concepts to imply a warranty
of habitability in all residential leases because tenants, particularly poor
urban tenants, had little leverage to demand better quality housing.154
In imposing implied warranties in residential leases and in contracts for
the sale of new homes, courts recognized that the caveat emptor doctrine
did nothing to protect tenants and home buyers.155 The justification for
caveat emptor was that a tenant or buyer could “discover and protect
himself against defects in [real] property.”156 In addition, traditional
landlord-tenant law was developed for an agrarian society in which the land
was much more valuable to the tenant than the dwelling.157 Modern tenants
have far less bargaining power than their agrarian predecessors, and unlike
those predecessors, the modern tenant does not have the skill to discover
defects in a building’s complex systems.158
Courts avoid rewriting contracts, and the courts that first read an
implied warranty of habitability into residential leases recognized this
limitation on their power.159 They justified the warranty by assuming that
reasonable people would agree that housing must be “habitable and fit for
living” and that therefore, if a landlord and tenant were to negotiate a lease,
such a warranty would be included.160
As society placed increasing value on safe, affordable rental housing,
legislatures and administrative bodies began to enact statutes and
regulations aimed at ensuring the availability of such housing.161 These
codes and rules represented “a policy judgment—that it [was] socially (and

homes and not by lay sellers of existing homes, recognizing that a vendor-builder has control over
the habitability of premises. Stevens v. Bouchard, 532 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1987).
152. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
153. Id. at 1078–79.
154. See id.
155. Frona M. Powell & Jane P. Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales
of Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 309–12 (1990).
156. Id. at 308.
157. See Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Residential Leases, 10 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 45 (1978).
158. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078; see also Dutenhaver, supra note 157, at 51.
159. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077–78; Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (N.J. 1970); Pines
v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Wis. 1961).
160. Marini, 265 A.2d at 533–34.
161. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L.
REV. 503, 503–05 (1982).
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politically) desirable to impose [the duty of providing safe housing] on a
property owner” and thus abolish the rule of caveat emptor.162 Describing
the need for safe housing in the 1960s, one court urged that “[t]he need and
social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid
population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal
cliché, caveat emptor.”163
The imposition of an implied warranty of habitability was seen as a
move away from classifying a lease as a property conveyance to classifying
a lease as a contract.164 Yet, by making the warranty of habitability nonwaivable, the courts veered from a freedom of contract approach. They
recognized also that the validity of the distinctions between contract and
property rules in landlord-tenant law was primarily historical and that
courts have a duty to “reappraise old doctrines in the light of the facts and
values of contemporary life.”165 In data security law, there is no such
history to discard, and the law can be written on a cleaner slate, with
protections pulled from contract, property, and tort law.166 William Prosser
once described the implied warranty as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract.”167 This illicit intercourse might provide the
right remedy for the theft of personal information; by importing contract
law concepts, judges can avoid twisting tort law to evade its limitation on
recovery for purely economic loss.168
One challenge that courts will face in implying a warranty of data
security is developing the standards that a payment system must meet in
order to satisfy the warranty. Courts imposing an implied warranty of
habitability were able to rely on housing codes for standards.169 In data
breach cases, the proper source for the elements of a quality payment
system is not as clear. In a case like DSW Shoe Warehouse, the plaintiffs
could use the fact that the FTC had filed a complaint against the retailer,
alleging that it had “fail[ed] to employ reasonable and appropriate security
measures to protect personal information and files.”170 The failure to
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 412–13.
Id. at 413 (emphasis in the original).
See Glendon, supra note 161, at 503.
Javins v. Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
One could also analogize a data transaction to a bailment. Doing so might strain doctrine
even less than imposing a warranty would. When a bailee misdelivers goods, the bailee is strictly
liable to the bailor for damages. See R.H. Helmholtz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of
Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992).
One can certainly think of a data breach as a misdelivery of personal payment data.
167. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
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169. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1081–82; Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J. 1973)
(listing factors that a court should consider in determining whether a lessor had breached a
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comply with PCI DSS would clearly constitute a breach of warranty, but as
noted above, PCI DSS is seen as a minimum standard of data security.171
The judicially-created implied warranty of habitability was a response
to changing social and economic conditions.172 Courts implied the warranty
of habitability at a time when society started to recognize that shelter is a
basic human necessity.173 The federal government recognized this in the
Housing Act of 1949, “which committed [the government] to . . . achieving
. . . the goal of a . . . suitable living environment for every American
family.”174 While data security is not yet ingrained in our culture as a basic
human need, lawmakers today are well aware that Americans may not
“fully understand and appreciate what information is being collected about
them” and may not have the power to stop unsafe practices from taking
place.175 Legislatures that have enacted data breach notification laws
likewise recognize that data theft is a significant problem; in fact California,
the first state to enact such a law, did so after one of the state’s general
purpose data centers suffered a security breach.176 The legislative findings
accompanying that law recognized that identity theft was one of
California’s fastest growing crimes, and that rapid notice of a data breach
might help consumers minimize potential harm to them.177
In imposing an implied warranty of habitability, courts recognized that
when a tenant rents an apartment or a house, that tenant “seek[s] a well
known package of goods and services” that includes working utilities and
proper maintenance.178 Likewise, a consumer giving her payment card in a
transaction expects that her information will be safeguarded in such a way
that she will not be exposed to identity theft. Because she, like the urban
tenant, cannot ensure the safety of her data on her own, courts should
consider imposing a warranty of data security on sellers who accept
payment cards.
CONCLUSION
Like residential tenants and buyers of new homes, the consumer who
uses the payment system on a daily basis has little ability to protect herself

171. Cheney, supra note 20, at 4 (discussing observations of Robert Carr, CEO of Heartland
Payment Systems at the time of the 2009 Heartland data breach).
172. See cases cited supra note 159.
173. See generally Glendon, supra note 161, at 528–45.
174. Id. at 519 (internal quotations omitted).
175. Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
111th Cong. (2010) (unpublished statement of John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cf
m?p=Hearings (follow “July 2010” hyperlink; then follow “Chairman John D. (Jay) Rockefeller
IV” hyperlink).
176. Winn, supra note 109, at 1142–43.
177. Id.
178. Javins v. Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir 1970).
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from data breaches. Some loss, therefore, should fall on the persons best
able to guard against data theft. The real estate warranties are examples of
judge-made warranties that respond to modern changes that put the
consumer at risk for economic harm. Unsafe electronic payment systems
likewise pose significant risks to consumers, particularly of data theft. One
of the beauties of the common law is that courts can refine it to respond to
modern conditions; indeed, the common law’s “continued vitality . . .
depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community values and
ethics.”179 Payment cards are a wonderful innovation,180 but the misuse of
the data that is collected from the users of those cards is a significant
problem. Judges should recognize that consumers feel less secure in their
financial lives when their data is compromised and fashion a warranty to
compensate them for their losses.

179. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
180. In late 2009, no less an expert than former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker
described the ATM as the most important financial innovation of the last 20 years. See Alan
Murray, Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly: The Former Fed Chairman Says the Conference
Proposals Don’t Go Nearly Far Enough to Accomplish What Needs to be Accomplished, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R7.

